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T

many fundamental economic changes.
Over the last century, world population grew rapidly, increasing to over 6
billion people. The ability of earth to feed such a large increase in human
population has been truly remarkable. This is due in large part to rapid technological
progress in agriculture and other sectors. In addition, over the last decade the debate
has shifted toward less reliance on government programs and toward a greater focus
on the working of private incentives. The shift reflects a better understanding of the
limitations of government policies in managing resource allocation efficiently. This is
true in developed countries (with the implementation of domestic welfare reforms in
many countries) as well as developing countries (e.g., following the structural
adjustment policies induced by the IMF and the World Bank in the 1990s). It also
reflects the trend toward globalization of markets and trade liberalization (as guided
by GATT/WTO negotiations over the last decade). In the context of these major
structural changes, the role of agriculture remains important. While it is well understood that agriculture is in the business of feeding the growing world population, its
role in a changing global economy remains imperfectly understood.
Problems of poverty, food insecurity, and malnutrition remain in developed as
well as developing countries. This is often seen as a problem of income distribution
both within each country and across countries. Government and non-government
institutions have implemented economic development and transfer policies to address
such issues. Yet, understanding the dynamic process of productivity and economic
growth remains poorly understood. This suggests a need to refine our understanding
of the linkages between malnutrition and economic development.
The objective of this chapter is to take a new look at the economics of food and
nutrition. I explore the adequacy of standard economic models in addressing nutrition
issues and their linkages with economic growth. Building on the intuitive and strong
relationships that exist between food consumption, nutrition, and survival, I examine
the linkages between malnutrition and the incentive to invest and accumulate capital.
I argue that such linkages have been somewhat unexploited in economic analysis. To
the extent that accumulations of physical and human capital are a crucial part of the
process of economic growth, this establishes new relationships between food
economics and economic development. One of the main insights developed in this
chapter involves the effects of nutrition on discounting the future. The basic idea is
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simple: food insecurity tends to shift economic motives toward current survival, thus
contributing to heavy discounting of the future. This heavy discounting provides a
disincentive to invest and reduces the prospects for capital accumulation and future
economic growth. Note that such effects go beyond the short-term effects of
malnutrition on labor productivity. The analysis provides some new hypotheses about
the factors affecting economic behavior. This provides new directions that can help
refine our understanding of consumption and investment behavior. The investigation
also gives new insights into policy analysis. I argue that the adverse investment
incentives of food insecurity and malnutrition have important implications for the
design and evaluation of economic policy. First, this can help motivate income
redistribution policies in favor of the poor, assuming that the poor have good
opportunities for physical and human capital accumulation. Second, this suggests that
in-kind transfers (e.g., food transfers) may be preferable to income transfers in
situations where stronger incentives for investments are provided. In this context,
food policy can be an important part of an overall economic policy designed to
stimulate growth and economic development.
Food Demand and Survival

M

UCH RESEARCH HAS BEEN CONDUCTED ON FOOD DEMAND.

The impact of
income and prices on food consumption behavior is now reasonably well
understood. It is typically based on neoclassical consumer theory, which provides
useful guidance on incorporating economic rationality into empirical modeling of
consumer behavior (e.g., Deaton and Muellbauer). Typically, the analysis is presented
at the household level. This reflects the fact that the household is the basic micro unit
for decision making. The household-level approach potentially neglects intrahousehold decision rules that can affect consumption and investment decisions. This
creates a dilemma for modeling economic behavior: while many decisions are made
at the household level, nutritional status must be assessed at the individual level
(because nutritional achievements can vary among individuals in the same
household). The analysis below is developed at the household level. This has the
disadvantage of neglecting issues of intra-household distribution and of heterogeneity
in nutritional status within the household. Its main advantage is that it will simplify
the presentation.
I emphasize the strong and intuitive relationships that exist between food intake
and human survival. This is very basic: people cannot survive without eating. As
such, food consumption is necessary for survival. This argument has been properly
emphasized in the economic literature on famines. For example, Sen has argued that
famines take place when the purchasing power of households falls short of satisfying
the nutritional needs of individuals. This has focused attention on the determinants of

DYNAMIC CONSIDERATIONS IN NUTRITION AND FOOD DEMAND

3

household purchasing power. In this context, it is useful to note that there always
exist feasible food consumption bundles that threaten human survival. This is true for
high income households (who always have the option of consuming little food), as
well as low income households (who may be forced to consume little food because of
low purchasing power). The following question naturally arises: what are the
implications of survival motives and food insecurity for household behavior? I
investigate this issue looking at both consumption and investment behavior. The
analysis of investment behavior necessitates the development of a dynamic model.
This requires some careful thinking about the role of food security in the analysis of
household intertemporal allocation decisions.
Household preferences are typically represented by a utility function. Looking at
decisions over time, this means an intertemporal utility function capturing household
preferences over the planning horizon. I start with the standard economic model
specifying intertemporal household preferences as the present value of future utilities:
U = u0(x0) + β u1(x1) + β2 u2(x2) + … = ∑t≥0 βt ut(xt),

(1)

where xt denotes the consumption bundle at time t, ut(xt) is the utility obtained at time
t, and β is a discount factor satisfying 0 < β < 1, t = 0, 1, 2, …. In general, x = (xf, xn)
includes both food items (denoted by xf) and non-food items (denoted by xn).
Equation (1) states that the utility obtained at each period is being discounted
according to the fixed discount factor β representing household time preferences.
Two fundamental assumptions are therefore implicit in (1). First, the utility function
in (1) is additive over time. Second, the discounting of the future is done at the
exogenous rate β. The main motivation for these assumptions comes from dynamic
programming, the basic analytical tool for analyzing dynamic resource allocation.
Indeed, the Bellman equation of dynamic programming is typically presented in the
context of a time additive objective function with a fixed discount rate. This has
generated useful insights into the dynamics of consumption behavior and the
implications of economic rationality for “consumption smoothing” over time (see,
e.g., Deaton).
While convenient, I argue below that the time additive utility function in (1) is
inadequate to capture the essence of food security issues. Indeed, in interpreting the
utility function as a reduced form representation of household preferences, the basic
neoclassical model of consumer theory (1) ignores survival issues. To see that, note
that (1) implies that ∂[∂U/∂xt]/∂xt′ = 0 for all t ≠ t′. This means that the marginal
utility of consumption at time t is independent of consumption during other periods,
i.e., that current food consumption behavior does not affect the marginal utility of
future consumption. But I have just argued that there always exist feasible food
consumption patterns that threaten human survival (when food intake is “too low”).
This means that low current food consumption can deny current survival and make
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future decisions irrelevant. If one wants to take survival issues seriously, this means
that current food consumption must affect the marginal utility of future consumption.
Yet, as just argued, model (1) is incapable of capturing such an effect. Thus, the
standard time-additive model (1) fails to reflect the fact that nutrition is necessary for
survival. This result shows that the standard dynamic household model based on (1) is
inconsistent with basic nutrition. There is a need then to rely on a less restrictive
model that better represents the strong linkages between food, nutrition, and survival.
Such a model is presented in the next section.
A Flexible Specification of Preferences

A

S JUST ARGUED, AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE STANDARD time additive model is
required. But can such a model be developed without invalidating the basic
backward induction scheme underlying dynamic programming? The answer is “yes,”
in the context of recursive preferences. Following Koopmans and Koopmans et al.,
consider the recursive specification of intertemporal household preferences

U = V(xt, xt+1, …) = U(xt, V(xt+1, …)),

(2)

where U(xt, V(xt+1, …)) is non-satiated in xt, and 0 ≤ ∂U/∂V < 1. This clearly
generalizes the time additive model (1). Indeed, equation (2) allows ∂U/∂xt′ to depend
on xt for t′ > t. As such, it allows current food consumption to affect the marginal
utility of future consumption, thus providing a framework to reflect survival issues.
Note how equation (2) captures future discounting. The term ∂U/∂V is a marginal
discount factor. It measures the marginal effect on current utility of obtaining one
more until the next period. I assume that this discount factor is bounded between 0
and 1, 0 ≤ ∂U/∂V < 1. This means that the household is in general concerned about
the future, ∂U/∂V ≥ 0. It also means that it values the present relatively more than the
future, ∂U/∂V < 1. Finally, it allows for the discount factor ∂U/∂V to vary with
economic conditions. Below, I emphasize the importance of this last characteristic.
Model (2) includes the time additive model (1) as a special case when ∂U/∂V = β.
Thus, in contrast with the time additive model (1), recursive preferences (2) relax the
assumption of a fixed discount factor. And, by endogenizing the discount factor, they
provide a basis for exploring linkages between food security and dynamic behavior.
Intuitively, one expects low food consumption at the current time to threaten
survival and to affect adversely how the household views the future. This means that
if food consumption xft were sufficiently low, one anticipates that the discount factor
would be low, i.e., that ∂U/∂V ≈ 0. Alternatively, if food consumption xft is relatively
high, then the discount factor ∂U/∂V is likely to be higher. This generates the
following hypothesis:
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Hypothesis H1: The discount factor ∂U/∂V is increasing in the food
consumption bundle xft.
With xt = (xft, xnt), note that hypothesis H1 does not state how non-food consumption
xnt affects the discount factor. The reason is that most non-food items are not
necessary for human survival.1 As a result, non-food consumption may not have a
clear effect on how individuals perceive their future. This makes it clear that
hypothesis H1 is largely motivated by the fact that adequate nutrition is necessary for
survival.
While hypothesis H1 focuses specifically on the role of food, it has a broader
intuitive interpretation. Since household income is an upper bound on household food
expenditures, it follows that variations in income can generate effects similar to the
ones stated in H1. This suggests that, if H1 holds, then one expects the discount factor
∂U/∂V to increase with household income. This is the hypothesis proposed by Fisher
in 1930. He writes (Fisher, p. 72):
Poverty bears down heavily on all portions of a man’s expected life. But it
increases the want for immediate income even more than it increases the
want for future income.

Again, the intuitive interpretation is that poor households’ concerns for survival
make them focus attention on short-term decisions at the expense of longer-term
economic payoffs. This means that poorer households tend to discount the future
more heavily. Alternatively, richer households would exhibit less concern for shortterm survival and thus discount the future less.
Consumption and Investment Behavior

I

N THIS SECTION, I ANALYZE THE IMPLICATIONS of recursive preferences (2) for
consumption and investment decisions. One attractive characteristic of recursive
preferences is that they allow backward induction to be implemented in a simple way
as in, for example, standard dynamic programming. To illustrate, consider a
household exhibiting recursive preferences (2). The household also makes investment
decisions. Let kt be a vector of physical and human capital of the household. The
capital evolves over time according to the state equation: kt+1 = ft(kt, ⋅) + zt, where
[ft(kt, ⋅) – kt]/kt is the natural growth rate of capital (or depreciation rate if negative),

1

Note that the arguments presented here could be developed more generally in the context of human
health. Then, based on survival motives, consumption goods that contribute to health (e.g., medical
services) would behave in a way similar to food intake. Such goods would likely satisfy hypothesis H1
as well. Then, the analysis presented below would apply in this broader context.
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and zt is the amount of household investments (disinvestment if negative) made at
time t. Note that, when negative, zt can represent asset liquidation as well as
borrowing in capital markets. In this context, the functioning of capital markets (e.g.,
the presence of credit rationing) would affect the feasible set for zt. At time t capital
stock kt generates a gross return denoted by gt(kt, ⋅). Let pt > 0 denote the market price
vector for consumer goods xt, and qt > 0 be the unit price vector of investments zt.
The household budget constraint at time t is then
pt xt ≤ gt(kt, ⋅) – qt zt.
This states that consumer expenditures (pt xt) cannot exceed gross income g(kt, ⋅)
minus net investment cost (qt zt).2 Then, using backward induction, optimal behavior
is given by the functional equation (see Streufert, 1990, 1992; Becker and Boyd):
Wt(kt) = Maxxt, zt {U(xt, Wt+1(ft(kt, ⋅) + zt)): pt xt ≤ gt(kt, ⋅) − qt zt, (xt, zt) = feasible},(3)
where Wt(kt) is the value function at time t. Denote the optimal decision rules in (3) by
xt* = xt*(pt, qt, kt)

(4)

zt* = zt*(pt, qt, kt)

(5)

for consumption, and by

for investment.3 They summarize how household behavior responds to the changing
economic environment.
In general, consumption and investment decisions are made jointly. Indeed, from
the budget constraint, they must both compete for household gross income gt(kt, ⋅).
However, the linkages between consumption and investment can be complex. Below,
I explore two aspects of these linkages related to food and nutrition: how malnutrition
can affect household productivity; and how food insecurity can affect investment
incentives.
Nutrition and Household Productivity

T

adversely affects labor
productivity (e.g., Arcand; Behrman and Deolalikar; Deolalikar; Haddad and
Bouis; Strauss; Strauss and Thomas; Wang and Taniguchi; Wheeler). In the model,
2

HERE IS EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE THAT MALNUTRITION

Note that since zt can be negative, the investment cost (qt zt) can also be negative. If so, (-qt zt) would
reflect the monetary value of capital liquidation and/or borrowing.
3
Under stationarity, the existence of a steady state solution to (3) is discussed by Boyd.
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these adverse effects can take place in two ways: through capital accumulation, and
through income generation. With x = (xf, xn), this suggests that food intake xf can
become an argument of the capital accumulation function ft(kt, xft) and of the income
generation function gt(kt, xft), with ft and gt being non-decreasing in xft.4 In the former
case, the productivity effect would be in the longer term, as malnutrition adversely
affects capital accumulation (e.g., by increasing the depreciation rate of human
capital). In the latter case, the productivity effect would be in the short term, as
malnutrition reduces labor productivity and the household’s capacity to generate
income. In general, the effects of xft on productivity are expected to be present only in
situations of significant malnutrition (i.e., when xft is low). This would imply that the
functions ft and gt are strictly increasing in xft when xft is low. Alternatively, when
food intake xft is moderate to high, xft would cease to have any effect on ft and gt.
This means that finding evidence that nutrition affects productivity requires data from
households facing significant malnutrition. In other words, such effects may be
important only for households in extreme poverty.
In situations where food intake affects productivity, the classical separability of
production and consumption decisions no longer holds. Indeed, if consumption has a
direct effect on productivity, household decisions between production, investment,
and consumption would necessarily be joint (as captured by the optimization problem
(3)). Therefore, standard neoclassical consumer theory which treats consumption
decisions as being separable from production and investment decisions (see, e.g.,
Deaton and Muellbauer) would provide an inappropriate framework with which to
understand consumption behavior. It would fail to capture the adverse effect of
malnutrition on household production capacity.
Consider the case where malnutrition has adverse effects on productivity through
both capital accumulation ft and income generation gt. Under differentiability and
assuming an interior solution, the first-order necessary conditions for (3) are
∂U/∂xt + (∂U/∂Vt+1)(∂Wt+1/∂kt+1)(∂ft/∂xt) = λt [pt – ∂gt/∂xt],

(6a)

(∂U/∂Vt+1)(∂Wt+1/∂kt+1) = λt qt,

(6b)

where λt > 0 is the marginal utility of income. Equations (6a) and (6b) are standard
marginal conditions. They state that, at the optimum, (discounted) marginal value
must equal marginal cost. From equation (6a), the marginal value of consumption xt
is [∂U/∂xt + (∂U/∂Vt+1)(∂Wt+1/∂kt+1)(∂ft/∂xt)]/λt, while the corresponding marginal
cost to the household is [pt – ∂gt/∂xt]. If (∂ft/∂xt) = 0 and (∂gt/∂xt) = 0, this reduces to
the neoclassical result:
∂U/∂xt = λt pt,
4

For example, the functions ft and gt could take the form ft(kt, xft) = ft(kt) F(xft) and gt(kt, xft) = gt(kt)
G(xft), where F(⋅) and G(⋅) are distribution functions.
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where production/investment decisions are separable from consumption decisions
(see, e.g., Deaton and Muellbauer). This illustrates how the effects of malnutrition on
productivity would alter neoclassical consumer theory. First, if (∂ft/∂xft) > 0, the
marginal value of food intake xft in (6a) includes the additional term:
[(∂U/∂Vt+1)(∂Wt+1/∂kt+1) (∂ft/∂xft)]/λt. When positive, this term increases the marginal
value of food consumption xft. Second, if (∂gt/∂xft) > 0, then the marginal cost of food
intake in (6a) includes the additional term [-λt ∂gt/∂xft] < 0, implying that malnutrition
reduces the marginal cost of xft. When combined, these two effects give additional
incentives to consume food xft. This reflects the fact that food intake now has two
roles to play: its neoclassical role of generating household utility, and its new role of
maintaining household productivity in situations of food insecurity.
Nutrition and Household Investment

T

zt, consider the firstorder condition (6b). In (6b), the marginal value of investment is (∂U/∂Vt+1)
(∂Wt+1/∂kt+1)/λt, while the marginal cost is given by the price qt. The marginal value
is the discounted marginal value of future utility, involving both the discount factor
(∂U/∂Vt+1) and the marginal utility of future capital (∂Wt+1/∂kt+1). Applying the envelope theorem to (3) under differentiability, the marginal utility of capital is given by
O EXPLORE HOW NUTRITION AFFECTS INVESTMENT

∂Wt/∂kt = (∂U/∂Vt+1)(∂Wt+1/∂kt+1)(∂f/∂kt) + λt (∂gt/∂kt).

(7)

This identifies two contributions: the discounted marginal utility of capital growth,
(∂U/∂Vt+1)(∂Wt+1/∂kt+1)(∂ft/∂kt), and the marginal utility of income generated by
capital, λt (∂gt/∂kt). The first term reflects the role of capital accumulation in
household decisions (see below).
To relate these results to previous literature, define household income at time t as
It = gt(kt, ⋅) – qt zt. For simplicity, I consider only the case where xt does not affect
gross income gt, i.e. where gt = gt(kt). In this context, household income It is gross
income from capital, gt(kt), net of investment cost, qt zt. From the budget constraint,
this is the amount of money available to the household to spend on consumption
goods at time t. Then, from optimization problem (3), consumption decision (4) may
be written conditional on income It. This gives
xt* = xt+(pt, It*, kt),

(4′)

= xt+(pt, gt(kt) – qt zt*, kt) = xt*(pt, qt, kt),

(4′′)
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where It* = g(kt) – qt zt*(pt, qt, kt). Equations (4′) and (4′′) give alternative forms of
optimal consumption behavior. While xt*(pt, qt, kt) in (4′′) gives a reduced form
representation of demand, equation (4′) provides a more structural representation that
isolates the effects of household income It*.
In equation (4′), the demand function xt+(pt, It*, kt) depends on price pt, income It,
and capital kt. Specifying consumer demand as a function of prices and income is
standard in neoclassical consumer theory, as well as in applied demand analysis (e.g.,
Deaton and Muellbauer). Equation (4′), however, exhibits two notable characteristics.
First, it treats income It* as an endogenous right-hand side variable (which depends on
both capital income and investment cost). This suggests a need to control for income
endogeneity in the empirical estimation of (4′) (e.g., LaFrance; Dhar et al.). Second,
after controlling for prices pt and income It*, equation (4′) expresses consumer
demand as a function of capital kt. This effect is due to the recursive structure of
preferences. To illustrate, consider the case of additive time preferences (1) where
discount factor ∂U/∂V = β is constant. Then, the marginal utility of investment in
(6b), (∂U/∂Vt+1)(∂Wt+1/∂kt+1), no longer depends on consumption goods xt. In this
situation, treating It* as given, it follows that kt no longer influences xt+, i.e. that
∂xt+/∂kt = 0 and xt* = xt+(pt, It*). This means that, under additive time preferences (1),
household consumption decisions become separable from capital accumulation:
capital accumulation can affect consumption only through its effects on household
income It*. Alternatively, finding evidence that capital kt affects consumption
decisions (where ∂xt+/∂kt ≠ 0) is necessarily associated with non-additive time
preferences. It means that under endogenous discounting (and after controlling for
income It*), household consumption decisions are not separable from capital
accumulation. Thus, examining whether capital kt affects demand xt+ provides a
simple test for the presence of endogenous discounting (where ∂U/∂V is not
constant). Empirical investigations of the effects of capital on consumption behavior
have been reported in the literature (e.g., West and Price). Indeed, these previous
empirical studies have typically been motivated by treating capital as a “preference
shifter”. My analysis suggests a different interpretation: finding evidence that capital
affects demand xt+ implies that the discount factor is endogenous. In this case, besides
its effects on income It*, capital kt also has a direct effect on demand xt+.
Implications

W

HAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS OF ENDOGENOUS DISCOUNTING?

As just
argued, it strengthens linkages between consumption and investment
decisions. First, from the household budget constraint, gross income is allocated
between consumption and investment. As a result, for a given income, there is always
a monetary trade-off between these two activities (e.g., buying more consumer goods

10

ESSAYS IN HONOR OF STANLEY R. JOHNSON

always means less money spent on investment). And this effect is present irrespective
of the structure of preferences. Second, endogenous discounting generates an additional effect: choosing a consumption bundle xt that affects the discount factor ∂U/∂V
also influences how the household views the future and thus its incentives to invest. A
key result was obtained by Hertzendorf. He showed that, in general, any factor that
increases ∂U/∂V tends to stimulate investment. This is intuitive: a rise in the discount
factor implies an increase in the relative importance of the future, and thus an
increase in the incentive to invest. In other words, any factor contributing to
increasing patience (i.e., to increasing ∂U/∂V) tends to stimulate capital accumulation. What is new here is that current consumption goods xt (and in particular food
intake xft) are specified as factors affecting the discount factor ∂U/∂V. This
establishes an additional relationship between consumption and capital growth. Since
formations of both physical and human capital are the basic engines of economic
growth (see Barro, 1990; Dolmas; Jones and Manuelli; Lucas; Lucas and Stokey;
Mankiw et al.; Rebelo; Romer), this provides interesting linkages between consumption behavior and economic growth. Below, I explore the economic and policy
implications of these linkages in the context of hypothesis H1.
Under H1, I hypothesized that higher food consumption xf increases ∂U/∂W
(reflecting survival motives). From Hertzendorf, this suggests that increasing food
intake tends to increase patience, which would stimulate investment in physical and
human capital. Alternatively, under H1, lowering food consumption xf decreases
∂U/∂W, dampens investment in physical and human capital, and deters long-term
economic growth. To the extent that capital accumulation is crucial in generating
economic growth, this establishes a strong linkage between food consumption and economic growth. It provides new insights into the health-related determinants of
economic development (see Barro, 1996; Fogel; Sachs and Warner; Sachs; Arcand;
Wang and Tanigushi). In particular, it shows how malnutrition can deter long-term
economic growth.
More generally, the analysis presented here sheds light on the existence of a
poverty trap. To illustrate, consider the case of a very poor household. Because of its
low income, it faces food insecurity and malnutrition. From H1, its low food
consumption means that it discounts the future heavily. This implies a focus on shortterm survival and little incentive to invest. Without investment, the household has
poor prospects for capital accumulation. And without capital accumulation (both
physical and human), its income stream cannot grow over time. As a result, the poor
household cannot find a way out of poverty. In this case, the poverty trap is induced
in part by endogenous discounting under hypothesis H1.5 Indeed, without endogenous

5

Note that this effect (and thus the existence of a poverty trap) will be strengthened if, in addition,
malnutrition decreases household productivity (as discussed above).
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discounting, the adverse effects of poverty on investment incentives would be
weaker.6
The above results also provide insights into the role of transfers and income
redistribution policies in economic development. For example, consider a transfer
from a rich household to a very poor household facing food insecurity. If this transfer
increases current food consumption, then from H1, it also increases patience and
stimulates investment. In the case where investment is sufficient to generate
significant capital accumulation, then it can put the household on a path to income
growth. Thus, in principle, a transfer to poor households can get them out of the
poverty trap and move them toward economic development. Importantly, the transfer
does not need to be permanent. Indeed, if a temporary transfer to a poor household
gets it out of the poverty trap, then household income may get on a path of
endogenous growth once out of the poverty trap. This is the kind of argument
supporting the maxim:
Give a man a fish and he can eat for a day. Teach him to fish and he
will never go hungry again.
These arguments stress that transfers toward poor households may be an effective
part of economic development policy. From hypothesis H1, this effectiveness may
depend crucially on its ability to improve the nutritional status of poor households.
The results obtained here provide useful insights on policy instrument choice. In
principle, either income transfers or in-kind transfers may help put poor households
on a path to long-term economic development. Policy instruments that might help
achieve this outcome include a progressive income tax, government welfare payments
to the poor, and food assistance programs. A caveat is in order, however, because
each policy instrument may have a different ability to create long-term income
growth. From hypothesis H1, a key factor is the effect of each policy instrument on
food intake (since it is higher food intake that affects the discount factor and the
incentive to invest). This indicates the importance of two factors: (1) the targeting of
transfers, and (2) the potential advantage of in-kind food transfers.
First, if income transfers have a small impact on food consumption, H1 suggests
that they would only marginally affect income growth. These small impacts would be
obtained if income transfers are spent mostly on non-food consumption. This may
happen if the targeted households do not suffer from nutritional deficiency. Indeed, if
6

Under exogenous discounting (where ∂U/∂V = β) and in the absence of credit rationing, poverty may
have only minimal effects on investment incentives. Indeed, a poor household facing good investment
prospects would simply borrow to finance its investment. Imperfections in the credit market, however,
may limit its borrowing capacity. It means that, under credit rationing, poverty would have an adverse
effect on investment incentives. This is true irrespective of the nature of intertemporal preferences.
Still, the analysis suggests that endogenous discounting under H1 would provide additional disincentives for investment (compared to exogenous discounting).
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middle-to-high income households were the target of income transfers, such
households would likely be well fed and would prefer to spend their extra income
mostly on non-food items. This stresses the importance of targeting the beneficiaries
of income transfers toward the low end of the income spectrum, where low income
households likely face food insecurity.
Second, the analysis suggests that food transfers may have greater impact on
household income growth than equivalent cash transfers. Indeed, being restricted to
food, food transfers (e.g., food stamps) are expected to have a stronger positive effect
on food consumption, and from H1, on investment and capital accumulation. The
reason is that a significant part of unrestricted cash transfers may be spent on nonfood items, which may have a smaller impact on investment incentives. This
argument indicates that, in an economic development policy, properly targeted food
transfers may have a greater effectiveness compared to equivalent income transfers.
The foregoing arguments are broadly applicable. They apply to transfers taking
place at all levels of analysis: at the local level, the regional level, the national level,
as well as the international level. As such, they provide useful insights into
redistribution policies for local communities, national governments, and, as well, for
international aid. By providing linkages between redistribution and economic growth,
they can be used in positive analysis as well as normative analysis. For example, they
can help explain that, while economists typically favor cash transfers, policy makers
sometimes prefer in-kind transfers. Also, they may help refine the design of
redistribution policies to improve their effects on income growth and long-term
economic development.
The analysis also indicates that transfers cannot guarantee economic development
for every household. Indeed, while transfers targeting the poor can improve their
welfare in the short run, they may fail to get them out of poverty in the long term in
the absence of capital accumulation. Meager prospects for capital accumulation can
be due to unfavorable economic environment (e.g., lack of infrastructure, badly
functioning markets, credit rationing, high scarcity level, absence of technological
progress) and/or limited human capital (e.g., low education, inferior managerial
abilities, physical handicap). Under such circumstances, accumulating either physical
or human capital can be particularly difficult. And without significant capital
accumulation, the prospects for income growth and economic development are
meager. This indicates that the economic efficacy of transfers can depend greatly on
the existing levels of human capital and infrastructure. Conditions favorable to capital
accumulation (e.g., some minimal level of human capital and infrastructure) are
required for transfers to stimulate economic growth. It suggests that transfers may fail
to contribute to economic development under severe scarcity, low education
attainments, and/or poorly functioning markets.
Finally, note that the effects of redistribution policies on investment and income
growth depend on the shape of the function ∂U/∂W(x). Indeed, under hypothesis H1,
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a transfer from the rich to the poor would have a positive effect on investment by the
poor but a negative effect on investment by the rich. The aggregate effect on
investment may therefore be ambiguous. It is only when the positive effect is stronger
than the negative effect that one can expect a positive aggregate effect on capital
accumulation and economic growth. Such a scenario may be more likely if the
discount factor ∂U/∂W first increases with xf for “low xf” but then becomes satiated
(with ∂U/∂W ≅ δ+ < 1 for “high xf”). Then, the adverse effect of a transfer on rich
households (for whom ∂U/∂W is approximately constant) may be small. In this case,
a more equal income distribution would contribute to capital accumulation and
growth. Interestingly, this would correspond to a situation where the standard time
additive model may be appropriate for rich households, but inappropriate for the very
poor. Economic behavior (including both consumption and investment behavior) may
therefore change significantly across the income spectrum. This possibility suggests
new directions of inquiry into positive economic analysis of how the current
distribution of income and assets can affect growth and economic development.
Concluding Remarks

W

E HAVE EXPLORED LINKAGES BETWEEN FOOD DEMAND, capital

formation,
and economic growth. A key aspect of the arguments relates to how
malnutrition and survival motives can have adverse effects on investment incentives.
This effect is captured in the context of recursive preferences where the discount
factor (reflecting time preferences) is endogenous and depends on food intake. This
generates useful insights on how food consumption relates to capital accumulation
and economic development. It provides new information on the design and
effectiveness of redistribution policy (e.g., income transfers, food aid) at the family,
national, and international levels.
Under endogenous discounting, I examined how income redistribution policies
may affect economic development. If, as expected, poor individuals are more
impatient, they have weak incentives to invest. As a result, their prospects for
economic growth are limited as they may be caught in a poverty trap. In this instance
a properly targeted redistribution policy may be able to help. One possibility is to
implement transfers targeted to poor households who have a chance to invest in
capital that will generate economic growth. The analysis indicates that properly
targeted food transfers may have a stronger effect on economic growth than an
equivalent cash transfer. Transfers can get the households out of the poverty trap and
contribute to sustained economic development. However, this requires good prospects
for capital accumulation. This suggests that a minimal level of human capital, good
infrastructure, and properly functioning markets are prerequisites for redistribution
policy to contribute to sustained income growth.

14

ESSAYS IN HONOR OF STANLEY R. JOHNSON

References
Arcand, J.-L. “Undernourishment and Economic Growth: The Efficiency Cost of Hunger.” ESD
Working Paper #14, FAO, Rome, 2001.
Barro, R.J. “Government Spending in a Simple Model of Endogenous Growth.” Journal of Political
Economy 86(1990): S103–S125.
Barro, R.J. “Health and Economic Growth.” Pan American Health Organization, Washington, DC,
November 1996.
Becker, R.A., and J.H. Boyd III. Capital Theory, Equilibrium Analysis and Recursive Utility. Malden,
MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1997.
Behrman, J., and A. Deolalikar. “Health and Nutrition”. In H. Chenery and T.N. Srinivasan (eds.),
Handbook of Development Economics (Vol. 3A). Amsterdam: North Holland, 1988.
Boyd, J.H. III. “The Existence of Steady States in Multisector Capital Accumulation Models with
Recursive Preferences.” Journal of Economic Theory 71(1996): 289–297.
Deaton, A. Understanding Consumption. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992.
Deaton, A., and J. Muellbauer. Economics and Consumer Behavior. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1980.
Deolalikar, A. “Nutrition and Labor Productivity in Agriculture: Estimates for Rural South India.
Review of Economics and Statistics 70(1988): 406–413.
Dhar, T., J.P. Chavas, and B.W. Gould. “An Empirical Assessment of Endogeneity Issues in Demand
Analysis for Differentiated Products.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 85(2003):
605–617.
Dolmas, J. “Balanced-Growth-Consistent Recursive Utility.” Journal of Economic Dynamics and
Control 20(1996): 657–680.
Fisher, I. The Theory of Interest. New York: Macmillan Co., 1930.
Fogel, R.W. “Nutrition, Physiological Capital and Economic Growth.” Pan American Heath
Organization, Washington, DC, October 2002.
Haddad, L.J., and H.E. Bouis. “The Impact of Nutritional Status on Agricultural Productivity: Wage
Evidence from the Philippines.” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 53(1991): 45–68.
Hertzendorf, M.N. “Recursive Utility and the Rate of Impatience.” Economic Theory 5(1995): 51–65.
Jones, L.E., and R. Manuelli. “A Convex Model of Equilibrium Growth: Theory and Policy
Implications.” Journal of Political Economy 98(1990): 1008–1038.
Koopmans, T.C. “Stationary Ordinal Utility and Impatience.” Econometrica 28(1960): 287–309.
Koopmans, T.C., P.A. Diamond, and R.W. Williamson. “Stationary Utility and Time Perspective.”
Econometrica 32(1964): 82–100.
LaFrance, J.T. “When Is Expenditure Exogenous in Separable Demand Models?” Western Journal of
Agricultural Economics 16(1991): 49–62.
Lucas, R.E. “On the Mechanism of Economic Development.” Journal of Monetary Economics
22(1988): 3–42.
Lucas, R.E., and N.L. Stokey. “Optimal Growth with Many Consumers.” Journal of Economic Theory
32(1984): 139–171.
Mankiw, N.G., D. Romer, and D.N. Weil. “A Contribution to the Empirics of Economic Growth.”
Quarterly Journal of Economics 107(1992): 407–437.
Rebelo, S. “Long Run Policy and Long Run Growth.” Journal of Political Economy 99(1991): 500–
521.
Romer, P.M. “Increasing Returns and Long Run Growth.” Journal of Political Economy 94(1986):
1002–1037.

DYNAMIC CONSIDERATIONS IN NUTRITION AND FOOD DEMAND

15

Sachs, J.D. “Macroeconomics and Health: Investing in Health for Economic Development.” Report of
the Commission on Macroeconomics and Health, Word Health Organization, Geneva, December
2001.
Sachs, J.D., and A.M. Warner. “Fundamental Sources of Long-Run Growth.” American Economic
Review 87(1997): 184–188.
Sen, A. Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation. Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1981.
Strauss, J. “Does Better Nutrition Raise Farm Productivity?” Journal of Political Economy 94(1986):
297–320.
Strauss, J., and D. Thomas. “Health, Nutrition and Economic Development.” Journal of Economic
Literature 36(1998): 766–817.
Streufert, P.A. “Stationary Recursive Utility and Dynamic Programming under the Assumption of
Biconvergence.” Review of Economic Studies 57(1990): 79–97.
Streufert, P.A. “An Abstract Topological Approach to Dynamic Programming.” Journal of
Mathematical Economics 21(1992): 59–88.
Wang, X., and K. Taniguchi. “Does Better Nutrition Cause Economic Growth? The Efficiency Cost of
Hunger Revisited.” ESA Working Paper #9, FAO, Rome, November 2002.
West, D.A., and D. Price. “The Effects of Income, Assets, Food Programs, and Household Size on
Food Consumption.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 58(1976): 725–730.
Wheeler, D. “Basic Needs Fulfillment and Economic Growth.” Journal of Development Economics
7(1980): 435–451.

